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THE PENNSYLVANIA BAILMENT LEASE
JAMES A. MONTGOMERY, JR.

In 18i9 "a liberal, perhaps an enlarged construction" was
given to the statute of 13 Elizabeth by Justice Gibson in the case
of Clow v. Woods,' which was to have a far reaching effect in the
law of sales. The statute in question rendered void all conveyances made with intent to defraud creditors. One Hancock
mortgaged certain personal property, but retained possession.
While no actual intent to defraud was shown on his part, the court
held that the separation of the possession from the ownership
was to be considered fraudulent per se as to creditors and purchasers without notice, and that therefore the conveyance was void
under the statute.
Five years later in Babb v. Clemson 2 this rule was extended
to the case of an ordinary sale, and seven years later in Martin v.
Mathiot,3 to a contract in which the agreement provided that possession was to be in the vendee, but title to remain in the vendor
until the whole purchase money was paid--in other words, a
conditional sale.
It was thus established that in cases where, by the terms of
the contract, a change of title is to take place, the separation of
the possession from the ownership is a fraud per se as to creditors. 4 The consequences of this rule can easily be seen. Not only
were a number of innocent transactions liable to be rendered of
no effect, but an enormous practical deterrent was placed on one
of the most convenient methods for making a sale, i. e., whereby
a purchaser could obtain the use of goods while paying for them

in one or more future instalments, and the vendor on his part
'5 S. & R.

275

(Pa. i8ig).

2io S. & R. 419 (Pa. 1824).
3 14 S. & R. 214 (Pa. 1826).

'This rule, of course, has a reasonable limitation. "The purchaser of
goods must, for the protection of the public, take such possession as is usual and
reasonable in view of all the circumstances of his purchase", Stevens v. Gifford,
137 Pa. 219, 20 Atl. 542 (i8go). It is therefore relaxed in the case of bulky
goods, goods not in the possession of the vendor at the time of sale, etc.
(920)
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could, until full payment, retain the legal title with its attendant
privileges. If the buyer's creditors might seize, or third parties
buy, the goods with impunity, naturally the seller would be loath
to enter into such a transaction. This situation made the time ripe
for some plan to render possible a credit sale with adequate protection to the seller.
-The rule of Clow v. Woods was never, of course, extended
to the ordinary bailment for use, where the article is rented
for a term and then returned, although in such a case the property
right is equally separated from the possession. The reason given
was that a bailment was a time-worn, legitimate transaction in
which the bailor had always been protected, while the conditional
sale presumably was a more recent legal situation as to which there
were no binding precedents. In the present day, however, when
newlyweds spend as they earn, and the apartment is furnished
from victrola to vacuum cleaner on the easy-payment plan, the
conditional sale seems no more strange or illegitimate than the
bailment-in fact, it is in some form or other a necessity.
The solution was found in the creation of what is now termed
the "bailment lease". This needs no particular description. It is
the familiar contract used in the sale of motor cars and other
commonly used articles. It is described in Myers v. Harvey '
as "a bailment, with a super-added agreement to vest the title in
the bailee when he should pay a sum certain . . . Such a trans-

action includes two distinct, but consistent contracts-the one taking effect, if at all, when the other is spent. The contract of bailment preserves the ownership of the bailor during the particular
relation created by it, and the contract of sale which supersedes
it, transfers the title as soon as it is called into action, by payment
of the price." Where a contract has been construed to be a bailmeant lease, it has always been held to give protection to the bailor
against creditors or bona fide purchasers of the bailee. Because
of the obvious analogy to a conditional sale, and because, as we
have seen, the latter affords no protection against the equities
of third parties claiming under the buyer, one is naturally led to
52 P. & W. 478

(Pa. 1831).
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inquire as to the real distinction between these two sorts of
contracts.
This distinction is discussed at length in Ott v. Sweatman,
and is summarized as follows:
"There are many cases in Pennsylvania in which has
been considered the liability of goods to levy and sale by the
sheriff, where the claimant has parted with their possession
under a contract with the execution defendant, by which the
latter has or may become the owner, the contract preventing
or attempting to prevent the title passing with the possession.
A careful examination of these cases will show that they
may be reduced to two classes, one in which the goods have
been bailed to the defendant, with the right in him to purchase them during the continuance of the bailment or at its
termination, and the other, in which the goods have been
delivered to the defendant, under a contract of sale, and the
seller has sought to retain a lien on them for the price. In
the former, the goods are not subject to the levy during the
existence of the contract of bailment, nor until the title has
actually vested in the bailee; in the latter they are subject
to the levy so soon as they reach the possession of the purchaser, though no part of the price has been paid. The
reason for the distinction is that, in a bailment, by the change
of possession, no title to the goods passes, and the necessities
of life require that bailments should be allowed and enforced; but where the possession of goods changes, under
a contract which is essentially one of sale, the title does pass,
though conditionally, and, as to an execution creditor of the
buyer, will be held to have passed absolutely, and the seller
will not be allowed to enforce the condition, as a lien for the
price, because a secret lien on personal property is against
public policy. The courts in determining whether or not the
contract was one of bailment, or one of sale with an attempt
to retain a lien for the price, have not considered what name
the parties have given to the contract, but what was its essential character."
This statement gives a satisfactory thesis, if logically carried
out. The question is, not what term the parties call the contract,
but is it essentially a bailment, or essentially a conditional sale?
8166 Pa. 217, 220-1, 31

At. iO, lO3 (1895).
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Such terms as "lease", "rent", "bailor", "bailee", and so on
should thus be of no primary importance if they conceal the real
nature of the transaction; so, also, should any expressions which
negative the passage of title until payment of the full sum specified.
With this in mind, our next inquiry is, "What are the essentials of a bailment on the one hand, and a conditional sale on the
other ?" They may be stated as follows: (i)

In a bailment, the

article is given to the bailee to be used by him for a certain term
and then to be returned to the bailor, who retains title throughout.
Payments are made for the use of the article. (2) In a conditional sale, the article is given to the conditional vendee with the
intention that the article is to belong to the vendee and payments
are made for the article itself. Title is temporarily reserved in
the vendor simply to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase
price.
In other words, in the first situation the goods are evidently
to be returned to the owner; in the second, the owner is making
one form of sale. Of course, a contract of bailment may also have
joined with it an option to purchase, or indeed any other contract;
the two, however, are distinct, and the legal incidents of the latter
do not affect the former. There are, it is needless to add, other
forms of bailment, but they do not enter into the problem here
discussed, with the exception of the bailment for sale, which will
be considered later.
The question, then, in each case should be, "Are the payments
in fact intended as consideration for the use of the article, or are
they intended as consideration for the article itself ?" The form
given the contract by the parties to the transaction is not of primary importance. As Professor Williston points out:
"Sellers desirous of making conditional sales of their
goods, but who do not wish openly to make a bargain in that
form, for one reason or another, have frequently resorted
to the device of making contracts in the form of leases, either
with options to the buyer to purchase for a small consideration at the end of the term, provided the so-called rent has
been duly paid, or with stipulations that if the rent throughout the term is paid, title shall thereupon vest in the lessee.
It is obvious that such transactions are leases only in name.

924
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The so-called rent must necessarily be regarded as payment
of the price in instalments, since the due payment of the
agreed amount results, by the terms of the bargain, in the
transfer of title to the lessee. This has been clearly recognized and many of the statutes relating to conditional sales
in express terms include leases within their scope. Apart
from statutes, the courts have disregarded the form of the
transaction and held that where payment of -so-called rent
nearly or quite pays the price of the goods, the bargain is a
conditional sale and subject to the rules governing that kind
of transaction." 7
It is obvious that in a state where possible penalties are
attached to a conditional sale, sellers who seek the same result
would attempt to make just such contracts as are described by Professor Williston. It is equally obvious that the courts of Pennsylvania, despite their inclination against the conditional sale, have
allowed such contracts to have a valid and separate existence, and
have based such distinctions as they have made, not on the essentials, but on matters of no ultimate significance. An examination
of some Pennsylvania cases will illustrate this fully.
Three early decisions mark the genesis of the bailment lease.
In Myers v. Harvey S property was leased with a provision for
sale, the actual details of which are not stated in the report. While
this case has often been cited as supporting the validity of the
bailment lease, its only real significance is the fact that it is one
of the first Pennsylvania cases to recognize the bailment lease. In
Clark v. Jack 9 a contract was made which stipulated for a sale
on a future day, but with immediate delivery. In substance, it was
a loan subject to be turned into a sale in two years, upon the payment of a judgment bond; the goods were levied upon by the
defendant, a judgment creditor of the bailee, and in an action
of trespass, the plaintiff, bailor, was allowed to recover. The contract was construed as establishing a bailment lease. In Chamberlain v. Smith 10 a yoke of cattle was delivered "to keep and use
in a farmer-like manner for one year" with the privilege of keepWI.LISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 336.
Supra note 5.
'7 Watts 375 (Pa. 1838).
1044 Pa. 431 (1863).
8
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ing the cattle at the end of the year upon the payment of $4o,
otherwise to be returned. It was held that this was a valid bailment, and that the owner should replevy the cattle from the purchaser of the bailee. It was pointed out in this case that there
was no contract of sale, but merely an offer to sell at a future
time, and that the transfer of possession was not in pursuance of
the sale, and hence not fraudulent. In this way the case was
distinguished from Martinv. Mathiot.11
These three cases have time and time again been cited to
support the bailment lease. As far as can be determined from
their facts, they are consistent with the theory advanced as, in
each case, the consideration for the sale may well have been a substantial consideration distinct from the provisions for payment of
rent. However, in Rowe v. Sharp' 2 no such distinction can be
found. In this case two billiard tables were let by S to G for nine
months, a sum to be paid for their use on certain dates. At the
end of the term, G was to re-deliver the tables and S was given
the privilege of re-capturing upon default. It was finally provided
that if all the covenants were fulfilled, S was to give G a bill of
sale at the end of the term for the amount of the payments. G
subsequently sold the tables to R, before his covenants to S were
fulfilled. -In an action of replevin it was held that S could recover
the tables from R. The agreement was held a valid bailment,
with an agreement for future sale. It can be seen that the decision
marks a departure from any theory distinguishing bailment from
conditional sale, since the payments for "rental" corresponded
exactly to payments on instalment for the price of the goods in
the case of a conditional sale. The same result was reached in
Enlow v. Klein,'3 which involved an agreement to "furnish"
horses, for which $2.00 per week was to be paid in 200 payments.
When the last payment was made, the owner of the horses agreed
to relinquish his rights to the "bailee". This decision was predicated solely on the ground that the agreement did not create a
present property interest in the bailee.
' Supra note 3.
'5I Pa. 26 (1865).
"79 Pa. 488 (1875).
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In Christie'sAppeal 14 a similar contract is also distinguished
from Martin v. Mathiot on the ground that the latter decision
involved a sale of chattels real. No attempt, however, has been
made to urge this distinction in subsequent cases.
In Stadtfeld v. Huntsman 15 a contract under which furniture
was to be purchased on instalments of $5 a week, the goods to
remain the property of the seller subject to removal by the seller
on default, was held to be a conditional sale and consequently a
subsequent purchaser from the vendee was allowed to keep the
furniture in an action of replevin by the vendor. This case was
cited as controlling in Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Hoover,16 in which
an agreement was entered into whereby the plaintiff agreed to
furnish four billiard tables to R, to be paid for in instalments, payments to be secured by a lease, and title to remain in the original
owner until final settlement. Judgment creditors of R subsequently sold the tables and were held not to be responsible in an
action of trespass by plaintiff. Rowe v. Sharp was distinguished, not on any substantial ground, but because in the earlier case there
was no agreement for security, and an express stipulation for the
return of the property.
In Dando v. Foulds '" the following rule was definitely laid
down:
to bring within the statute of Elizabeth, the contract must vest presently a title of some kind in the buyer, and
the mere right to acquire the title at some future time . . .
will not have that effect. In other words, the title to the
goods must pass to the vendee at the time he receives the
possession, otherwise there is no sale, but only a bailment."
This was reaffirmed in Edwards' Appeal,"' where it was
pointed out that if the transferee is to hold the goods for a definite
period, to become the owner at the end of that period or to pay for
their use, the transacion amounts to a bailment.
1,85

Pa. 463 (1877).
is92 Pa. 53 (879).
1695 Pa. 5o8 (188o).
17lO5 Pa. 74 (1884).
iOS Pa. iO3 (1884).

(1889).

See also Ditman v. Cottrell, 125 Pa. 6o6, 17 Atl. 504
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Farquhar v. McAlevy "I involved a "hire" of certain machinery, for which $750 was to be paid at the end of six months
and an additional $750 at the end of twelve months, with interest
at six per cent. Title was to remain in the original owner, with
the privilege to the transferee to purchase for one dollar. In a
feigned issue to try title, between the original owner and a subsequent purchaser at a sheriff's sale, the transaction was held to be
a conditional sale, but again the ground of the decision was that
there was no express stipulation for the return of the property
at the end of the term.
Similarly in Ott v. Sweatman 20 a contract identical in its
terms with that in Rowe v. Sharp was held a conditional sale,
and this.despite an express stipulation that it was to be treated as
a lease.
In Goss Printing Co. v. Jordan 21 a printing press was sold
on approval. While the purchaser had possession for thirty days'
trial, the parties changed the contract of sale to one of bailment
with an alternative conversion into a sale on compliance with certain conditions. Shortly thereafter a judgment creditor of the
purchaser had the sheriff levy on the property. It was held that
the contract was a bailment lease, and that the parties could
properly change from a sale to a bailment while the contract was
still executory. By way of dictum, however, the court said that
if delivery is made under the contract of sale, and the second
contract is in fact an afterthought merely to secure the price,
then the whole transaction will be treated as one of conditional
sale.
In Lippincott v. Scott 22 it was held that the delivery of notes
to cover the various instalments did not prevent the transaction
i42 Pa. 233, 2r Atl. 8II (i89i).
Supra note 6.
171 Pa. 474, 32 Atl. 1031 (1895). See also Federal Sales Co. v. Kiefer,
273 Pa. 42, x6 Atl- 545 (1922) ; Schmidt v. Bader, infra note 27; Byers Machine Co. v. Risher, 41 Pa. Super. 469 (igio) ; Michael v. Stuber, 73 Pa. Super.
390 (1920). The bailment lease was considered a dodge in Morgan-Gardner
Electric Co. v. Brown, 193 Pa. 351, 44 At]. 459 (1899).
2I98 Pa. 283, 47 Atl. r115 (1901).
See also Link Machinery Co. v. Continental Trust Co., infra note 26; Lippincott v. Holden, ii Pa. Super. [5 (I89) ;
Byers Machine Co. v. Risher, mtpra note 2i; Wilson v. Weaver, 66 Pa. Super.
599 (I917).
And it is immaterial that installments bear interest: See case cited,
and Euwer v. Greer, 29 Pa. Super. 262 (1905).
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from being a bailment lease; and in Stiles v. Seaton 23 the rule
of Goss PrintingCo. v. Jordan was reaffirmed, and it was further
laid down that a contract, otherwise a bailment, is not vitiated
by the fact that it contains no stipulation for the return of the
property, except on default, 24 and no stipulation for a definite
term. This has been affirmed in numerous cases. It was, however, departed from in Kelly Springfield Road Roller Co. v.
Spyker,2 5 which involved a "lease" of a roller for the full sum
of $2,ooo, payable in $250 instalments every other month. Here

the court definitely stated that the contract was meant to be a
conditional sale, that the use of particular words was immaterial,
and that the two types of contracts could not be distinguished if
"sale" were substituted for "lease". Subsequently, however,
a bailment lease was sustained in Link Machinery Co. v. Contiitental Trust Co. 26 upon a contract indistinguishable from that in
the Spyker case except in unimportant details.
The most recent Supreme Court case of any significance is
that of Schmidt v. Bader2 7 This involved a contract drawn as
a lease, with a definite rental payable every two months, the right
in the transferor to retake on default, and a right in the transferee
to obtain a bill of sale at the end of the contract period upon the
payment of $5.00. In an action of replevin by the transferor
against a purchaser at a bankrupt sale the contract was held to be
one of bailment, upon the express authority of Rowe v. Sharp.
No attempt has been made to discuss all the cases which have
taken up the construction of such contracts. Reference has been
made only to those which have been thought to be most significant
and have raised new points of distinction. Others will be found
cited in the footnotes.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the cases referred to, with more or less certainty, although exceptions will
m2oo Pa. 114, 49 Atl. 774 (19OI).

"Federal Sales Co. v. Kiefer, supra note 21 ; Jones v. Wauds, i Pa. Super.
269 (1896) ; Harris v. Shaw, 17 Pa. Super. i (igoi) " Porter v. Duncan, 23 Pa.
Super. 58 (19o3) ; Miller v. Douglas, 32 Pa. Super. 158 (19o6) ; Reading Automobile Co. v. De Haven, 53 Pa. Super. 344 (1913).
t'215 Pa. 332, 64 At. 546(19o6).
227 Pa. 37, 75 At. 985 (1910).
2T284 Pa. 41, 13o Atl. 259 (1925).
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always be found. A contract will be construed as a bailment
lease notwithstanding the fact that (I) no fixed term of bailment
is set, (2) no express provision is made for the return of the
goods at the end of the term, (3) the contract was originally
drawn as a conditional sale but changed while still executory, (4)
notes are given for the various instalments, or (5) the instalments
themselves bear interest.
No contract which purports to be a bailment lease has been
held a conditional sale where the "bailee" is merely given an option
to buy at the end of the term, even though this option is for a
nominal sum. The following quotation from Stern & Co. v.
Paul 2J is therefore undoubtedly a conservative statement of the
law on this subject:
generally, where a person receives possession of a
chattel under an agreement which contains apt words of
lease, fixes a definite term and a certain rental, and includes
an undertaking to return the same property at the termination
of the lease, the mere fact that the bailee has an option
to purchase the property during or at the expiration of the
period of the lease does not transform the transaction into a
conditional sale." 29
Where the option provision is omitted and title automatically
vests in the bailee upon the payment of a stipulated rental, the cases
are in confusion and cannot be logically resolved. In by far the
greater number, however, where words denoting a bailment lease
are used, the contract has been held to be such. So in Schmidt v.
Bader, we find the court relying upon the old case of Rowe v.
Sharp, thus showing that the doctrine of the former decision has
not been discarded. Such a construction has commonly been
given, unless the price was to be paid in one lump sum or the
original contract was by its terms a conditional sale. In the latter
case, where the property has actually been delivered under the first
contract, the courts appear to have taken the ground that an obvious attempt was being made to avoid the restrictions placed
on such a method of passing title. It must be admitted, however,
196 Pa. Super. 112 (z929); (1929) 3 TEMPLE L. Q. 451.

I Supra note 28, at 1i6.
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that in some cases the omission of terms usual to a bailment has
been held to create a sale, while in others again the omission of
such terms has been ignored upon similar facts.
These petty distinctions and refinements hardly merit serious
study. As a practical matter, almost everyone nowadays can draw
a bailment lease which will be upheld, and litigation as to the nature
of the contract has become increasingly rare. The essential point
to grasp is that in practically none of the cases has the only significant distinction been made. If the owner of the goods is willing to
surrender title for the sum of the rental payments, the transaction
is a sale, and nothing more remains to be said. Once this factor is
granted, the problem is solved, and the various technical features
invariably brought to the fore by the courts become immaterial.
It is farcical in such a case to talk about the "intention" of the
parties as construed from their acts and writings. The terms of
the bargain speak eloquently and definitively on this point. No
owner will pass title to his goods unless he gets what he considers
to be their value to him, and when he agrees to pass title on getting
a certain value, he is making a sale no matter what the transaction
is called.
This point of distinction applies in every case where no additional payment beyond the stipulated rental is required or where
such payment is purely nominal. This, of course, does not mean
that the additional payment must in every case reflect the full value
of the goods. It is perfectly conceivable for the owner to feel
that the profit from a long-term lease may justify him as a business matter in taking less than the market value for the goods
from one who consents to enter into such a contract. On the
other hand, it is obvious that where the bailee is given an option to
buy the goods at the end of the term for the large sum of one
dollar, as is the case in the usual contract, the goods are not
rented but sold. It requires no legal learning to realize the truth
of this assertion.
The form of passing title means nothing. We may say in
the one case that there is a present contract of sale, but that the
seller retains title as security for the payment of the price, or,
as Professor Williston has expressed it, a sale with a mortgage
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back to the seller. On the other hand, we may say that the sale
does not come into existence until all the payments have been made.
In either case the result is the same. The parties have intended to
make a sale. Possession has passed to the buyer, but title has
remained in the seller. Therefore, in all logic, the ban of Clow v.
Woods and Martin v. Mathiot applies.3 0
The Measure of Damages Applicable to a Baihnent Lease
The difficulties of making a bailment out of what is essentially
a sale become apparent when it is important to determine what
measure of damages the bailor may invoke upon a diversion or
destruction of the chattel. In Edwards' Appeal 31 it was said
by way of dictum:
"If during the period of the bailment the bailee pays part
of the price fixed, a creditor may levy upon and sell the
bailee's interest, but no right of the bailor will thereby be
extinguished."
In Collins v. Bellefonte Central Railway Co.3 2 the question

arose as between the bailor and a purchaser at a judicial sale.
A railroad company had been given possession of certain rolling
stock upon a bailment lease. The cars were later sold out on a
prior mortgage, which purported to cover all such goods of the
railroad. In an action by the bailor against the purchaser at the
mortgage sale, it was held that the former had a right to recover,
but that whatever equities the bailee had by virtue of the lease
passed to the defendant. Hence the measure of the plaintiff's
damages was taken to be the value of the property as stipulated
in the bailment contract, mitigated by the amount already paid
by the bailee.
Both these cases recognize an interest in the bailee under
a bailment lease which is greater than that of the usual lessee. In
both cases, however, the creditor or purchaser succeeded to the
bailee's interest, whatever that interest may have been. The prob'The inconsistencies of the bailment lease are discussed in In re Morris,
156 Fed. 597, 598 (D. C. Pa. i9o7) ; 6 C. J. (1916) io8g.
'Supra note 18.
1i Pa. 243, 33 Adt. 331 (1895).
2
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lem is squarely presented in GeneralMotors Acceptance Corporation v. B. & 0. Railroad Co. 33 In this case an automobile was
transferred on a bailment lease with a total rental of $887. At
the time the unpaid rentals aggregated $56o.o9, the automobile
was totally destroyed as the result of the negligent operation of one
of the trains of the defendant company at a grade crossing.
Actions were brought against the Railroad both by bailor and
bailee. The latter's right to recover was denied because of his contributory negligence. It was properly held, however, that his
negligence could not be imputed to the bailor, and a judgment
was entered by the trial court for the latter in the sum of $725,
the market value of the car at the time of the accident.
Upon appeal to the Superior Court, the judgment was reversed upon the measure of damages. As the contract was one
of bailment lease, the Superior Court held that the damages could
not be limited to the sum of the unpaid instalments. It was pointed
out that a contract for the term of the lease was only a bailment,
with the mere right to acquire title at some future time; that the
Railroad Company was a tortfeasor and could not succeed to any
of the bailee's rights under the lease; and to allow the bailor
to recover only the unpaid instalments was to violate the theory of
the lease and to treat the transaction as one of conditional sale.
On the other hand, it was held that the measure of damages
accepted by the court below could not be sustained, and that the
option in the bailee to purchase the car for one dollar at the expiration of the term necessarily affected the value of the bailor's interest in the car. It was therefore decided that the bailor was entitled
to recover the "actual value of its ownership in the property",
which was dependent to a large extent upon the length of time
the lease had been running and whether the bailee had paid the
specified rentals, and that the value of the property right was
therefore a question of fact for the jury under the circumstances
indicated.
This decision obviously leaves the measure of damages in
a very unsatisfactory state. The reason for the court's decision
=97 Pa. Super. 93 (1929).
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is apparent. It was unwilling to lay down a rule under which, in
some cases, the bailor might receive almost double the actual value
of the property. Such a situation would arise where the chattel
was destroyed just before the final payment on the lease. On the
other hand, the court could not award merely the unpaid instalments, since such a theory would in effect admit that the contract
was not a lease, but a sale. Just how a jury can determine the
"actual value" of the ownership is problematical. The practical
answer undoubtedly is that the jury will award an amount equal
to the unpaid instalments, which indeed is the justice of the case.
However, the rule itself is unsatisfactory. It is because of the
illogicalities which are inherent in the bailment lease that such a
result is brought about.
Bailments for Sale
The appellate courts have recently refused to sanction the
bailment lease in the case of contracts whereunder the transferee
receives the article, not for his own personal use, but for ultimate
sale to another on his own account, or, as they are termed in
the decisions, "bailments for sale".
No problem arises in the case of the true bailment for sale,
under which the bailee is in fact the agent of the bailor in the
sale, and is actually selling for the latter's account, not his own.
Such are obviously legitimate transactions. Thus in McCullough
v. Porter34 it was held that an agreement to furnish goods to an
insolvent at invoice prices, he returning the invoice price to the
consignors after sale and retaining all realized above that sum
for the support of himself and family, was a bailment, and that
the goods were not subject to claims of his creditors. A similar
contract was sustained as a bailment lease in Becker v. Smith,3
whereby the transferee was to receive certain personal property to
sell on commission, to deposit the proceeds with a banker, and to
become the owner of any property remaining after the named
4 W. & S. 177 (Pa. 1842).
Z59

Pa. 469 (1868).
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cases the sales were made priIn both
36

marily in the bailor's interest.

On the other hand, the same view was taken in Brown Bros.
v. Billington.37 In this case a dealer desired to purchase bicycles
abroad on credit. He applied to the plaintiff for letters of credit,
which were sent to the London office of the plaintiffs, accompanied
by a draft and invoices. The London office accepted the papers,
and the goods were shipped to the plaintiffs as their property and
transferred to the dealer upon his signing a "trust receipt". This
receipt specified that the dealer had received the property, held
the goods in trust for the plaintiffs with liberty to sell the same
for their account, and agreed to hand over the proceeds to them to
be applied against the acceptances under the letter of credit. It
was held that the transaction constituted a bailment, that title was
in the plaintiffs, and that consequently a judgment creditor of the
dealer could not levy on the bicycles.
The more recent cases, however, seem impossible to reconcile
on principle with Brown Bros. v. Billington. The problem has
come up chiefly with reference to credit arrangements in connection with the sale of automobiles. In Root v. ReNblic Acceptance
Corp.38 the owner of an automobile, to secure a loan, executed
a bill of sale and storage receipt to the one making the loan, who
later executed a bailment lease back to the original owner, there being no change in possession. It was held that the general creditors
of the "bailor" were not cut off by the bailment lease. In Republic
Acceptance Corp. v. Smith 31 the same result was reached on behalf
of the landlord. In Sterling Commercial Co. v. Smith 40 the defendant was a dealer in automobiles. He required additional cash
to pay a sight draft on a carload of trucks, and borrowed the necessary amount from the plaintiff. Defendant executed to plaintiff
a bill of sale for one of the trucks contained in the shipment, and
'See also Middleton v. Stone, Iii Pa. 589, 4 Ati. 523 (x886), where the
problem is analyzed; 6 C. J. (1916) og.
37 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 904
(1894).
n 2 7 9 Pa. 55, 123 Atl. 65o (1924).

'88 Pa. Super. 349 (1926).
4029I
Pa. 236, 139 Atl. 847 (927).
139 Ati. 873 (1927).

See also Wendel v. Smith,
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at the same time received back a bailment lease on the same car.
Defendant also gave to the plaintiff a storage receipt in which he
agreed to keep the truck in his showroom and return it to the plaintiff on demand. Subsequently ,the dealer went bankrupt and the
trustee in bankruptcy was held to have the superior right to the
car.
It is true that in the above cases the title to the goods was
in the dealer before he executed the sale or trust receipt, and
therefore the decisions turned mainly on the lack of change of possession. It was pointed out in the Sterling case that as the sale
itself was void, the subsequent bailment lease would also be of no
effect. Iowever, the cases distinctly show that it is the determination of the court to "look through the screen of paper titles
to ascertain what was the real situation", and that where the real
purpose of the transactions between the parties was to secure payment of loans from plaintiff to defendant, the bailment lease
would not be upheld.
In Hoeveler-Stutz Co. v. Cleveland Motor Sales 41 the issue
was directly presented. Here the automobile had been delivered by
a distributor to the defendant, a dealer, upon a bailment lease.
Later the dealer sold the car to a third party. It was held, in an
action of replevin by the distributor, that the purchaser from the
dealer could retain the car. The court said in this connection:
"A distributor cannot deliver automobiles, or any other
kind of property, to a dealer for the purpose of having the
latter sell them, and at the same time tie up the title, as respects a purchaser from the dealer, by executing a bailment
for their use. He cannot use this form of security for a
transaction which contemplates a sale by the so called bailee,
and make the purchaser an unwitting guarantor of the credit
of his dealer. This contract which constitutes a valid form
of security for the delivery of motor cars or other personal
property to the using public cannot be extended to protect
a manufacturer or distributor who furnishes them to a
dealer to sell, at least, as against purchasers from the latter.
There are other forms of security which may be resorted to
92 Pa. Super. 425

(1928).
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in such cases; but a bailment for use is inconsistent with a
delivery for sale, as respects purchasers from the dealer."
This case distinguishes Leitch v. Sanford Motor Truck Co.,42
in which a truck was similarly given by a motor company to a
dealer on a bailment lease and exhibited by the dealer in his showroom. The dealer transferred the truck as collateral security
for a debt to a bank which had no knowledge of the bailment, and
it was held that the Motor Company could recover. The court
in the Hoeveler-Stutz Co. case pointed out that while the transferee
in the Leitch case was a dealer in trucks, there was nothing in that
fact necessarily inconsistent with a delivery for use, that the truck
may have been intended for demonstration, and that in any case
it did not affirmatively appear that the purpose of delivering the
car to the dealer was that he should sell it. While the distinction
seems unsatisfactory, it is believed that in view of the later cases
it will be followed, and that the Leitch case will be dismissed as
unimportant on its facts.
The most recent decision is that of Commonwealth v.
Williams, 43 involving a prosecution for larceny of an automobile
by a bailee. The defendant, who received certain cars from the
Chevrolet Motor Company, had executed simultaneously a trust
receipt and promissory note to the General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, a credit concern. The dealer then applied the money
he received from the sale of these cars to his own use. The court
held that the transaction was not a bailment, but a conditional sale,
and reversed the conviction. It was pointed out in the opinion
that the cars were shipped directly from the Motor Company,
and that the Acceptance Corporation never had possession, that
the cars were placed in the possession of the defendant for sale,
and that they were regarded as collateral on the loan from the
finance company for the repayment of which the defendant had
given his promissory note. Such a relation was held inconsistent
with the legal conception of a bailment.
The only conclusion to be drawn from these later cases is
that a "bailment lease" will be considered in reality a conditional
Pa. 16o, 123 Atl. 658
"93 Pa. Super. 92 (1928).
42279

(1924).
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sale where it is given by a dealer either to a distributor to secure
the payment of the price, or to a finance company to secure a loan,
and whether it is executed before or after the dealer receives
actual possssion of the goods. This result is consistent with the
decision of Clow v. Woods. Whether the document given to the
creditor is called a storage receipt, a trust receipt, a bailment lease,
or some other name, is immaterial. What the creditor is doing
in each case is retaining or obtaining title as security for the payment of the price of the goods, while the debtor at the same time
has them in his possession. They would seem in effect to overrule
the decision in Brown Bros. v. Billington, although this has not
been done in so many words. The transaction set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams cannot be distinguished factually from
that of Brown Bros. v. Billington. It will be noted that both in
the Hoeveler-Stutz Co. case and in the Williams case, the dealer
had not received possession before the lease or trust receipt was
executed. The basis of the decision in Brown Bros. v. Billington
cannot be taken with too much seriousness. The dealer there obviously was not selling the goods for Brown Bros.; the latter were
engaged in the banking business, not the bicycle business. The
real object of the transaction was to provide a credit arrangement
whereby the dealer could engage in the business of selling bicycles.
If the sale of automobiles to a dealer cannot be protected by a
bailment lease, then logically no sound reason can be found for
protecting a similar sale by saying in the contract that the goods
and the proceeds therefrom are held in trust for the creditor.
In both situations creditors of, and purchasers from, the dealer
have equal equities.
The only query is why the courts have not gone further.
If the delivery of cars to a dealer under a bailment lease is unfair
to his creditors, it is equally unfair to the creditors of one who
buys for his own use. The sole answer that can be given is that
bailment leases to the ultimate purchaser have become sanctioned
by time, whereas similar leases to a dealer are of comparatively
recent origin. This, however, still does not explain the "trust
receipt", which, as has been pointed out, cannot logically be distinguished.
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The Recordation of the Bailment Lease
In this state (Pennsylvania) it is not necessary to record the
bailment lease to protect the title of the bailor. The Uniform
Conditional Sales Act provides for the recording of such contracts
as come under its terms; and in its original form, as adopted by
most states, covers not only the ordinary conditional sale but "any
contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee
or lessee contracts to pay in compensation a sum substantially
equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it is agreed that
the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming, the owner of such goods upon full compliance with the terms
of the contract." This provision, however, was omitted from the
act as adopted in this state.4 4 Furthermore, in the Commissioners'
draft, the word "buyer" is defined as one who "buys or hires",
whereas in the Pennsylvania Act the words "or hires" are omitted,
as are the words "or leases". All doubt as to the intention of the
Legislature was removed by the recent case of Stern & Co. v.
Paul.45 It was there pointed out that the legislative history of the
Conditional Sales Act, as disclosed by the journals of the House
and Senate, showed that as passed by the Senate it corresponded
exactly with the draft of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, but
was subsequently so amended as to omit all references to contracts for the bailment or leasing of goods. This significant omission was consequently held to withdraw bailment leases from the
operation of the statute.
The present status of such contracts is, therefore, a rather
ironical one. In the great majority of states the conditional
sale was originally held to afford full protection to the vendor.
In this state, however, the rights of the latter were treated as
inferior to those of purchasers from or creditors of the vendee.
Since then it has come to be recognized that some sort of protection was justly due innocent third parties, and the Uniform Con"Conditional Sales Act of May
1928) § 19727a et seq.

12,

1925, P. L. 6o3, PA. STAT. (Supp.

' Supra note 28. The need for such a provision was pointed out in Mueller,
Conditional Sales in Pennsylvania Since the Adoption of the Sales Act (1923)
72 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 123.
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ditional Sales Act, adopted generally both by other jurisdictions
and by this state, requires that such transactions be recorded if the
seller desires protection. The bailment lease, however, which is
simply the conditional sale masquerading under another name, has
continued without restriction, and Pennsylvania, which frowned
upon the conditional sale when other states approved it, exempts
the bailment lease from the operation of the Conditional Sales Act,
although otherwise it has been brought within the provisions of
40
that statute.
"In connection with the general subject, attention is called to Thompson,
Election of Remedies in Bailment Lease Contracts (1928) 3 TE PLE L. Q. 274.
As might be expected, in view of the accepted construction, a fortiori credit
sales are construed as bailments under the Capital Stock Tax Act of July 15,
igig, P. L. 948, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §§ 20363-4; Commonwealth v. National
Cash Register Co., 271 Pa. 406, 117 Atl. 439 (1921) ; Commonwealth v. Motors
Mortgage Corp., 297 Pa. 468, 147 At. 98 (1929). But as the corporations concerned would have insisted on protection from third parties under the terms of
the "leases," it is only fair to take them at their own word, and treat the goods
as their own for purposes of taxation.
The current distinctions between lease and sale may be found in a recent
publication, Scorr, LAw oF BALMENTS (1931). No attempt is made at any
fundamental analysis.

